Water, Development, and Nature in Korea:Struggling towards Sustainability by McCormack Gavan
Traditional Korea, like Edo period Japan, gave highest priority to avoiding growth
or change.  Frugality, recycling, and avoidance of waste were fundamental, local
communities functioned as sustainable ecological units, meeting energy requirements
from the adjacent forests and recycling wastes so as not to pollute the rivers and
ground-water.1) Renewable energy, recycling of materials, and zero waste were the
principles that underpinned the balance between human society and nature, and that
balance was sustainable, and it was indeed sustained until the fabric of the East Asian
order was torn apart and re-assembled during the tumultuous nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
Despite the convulsions at the level of the state and the global system, the old order
of Korean rural society only slowly declined.  Late in the nineteenth century it was
convulsed in rebellion, but before any revolutionary transformation could take place,
the national subjugation under Japan began.  The impact of Japanese colonialism
(1910-1945) on the physical environment was dramatic.  With the dramatic rise in
population came urbanization, road, rail and harbour, infrastructural development,
large-scale land reclamation and a measure of industrialization.  However, the collapse
of the Japanese empire in 1945, followed shortly afterwards by the Korean War (1950-
1953), saw the country devastated, set back by decades.  When a regime committed to
development as a national strategy was installed in 1961, it had to begin from
something like a clean slate.
Developmentalism then washed over Korea in a long, tumultuous and all-
enveloping wave that reached every corner of the country, through military
dictatorship and democratic regime alike, until the system foundered in crisis and near
collapse in 1997.  Under its influence, frugality and resource conservation turned to
wastefulness and resource exploitation; the constraints of nature were rudely set aside.
Mobilization of people and resources for growth became the national religion. 
In the span of a mere three decades, Korea was transformed from agrarian to
industrial society, its economy lifted from sub-Saharan African levels to Asian ‘Tiger’
status.  During the period 1963 to 1990, relentless growth maximization policies were
pursued by a dedicated group of technocrats, first under the military dictatorship of
Park Chung-Hee (which brooked criticism or opposition from neither capitalist nor
worker) and then under various regimes during the transition to democracy.  GDP over
these almost three decades grew at an average annual rate of 8.8 per cent.2)
Such was the social commitment to growth that few questioned the appropriations
from nature, especially of the marine and mountain environment, or the onslaught on
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nature by the virtually unfettered release of industrial, household, and agricultural
wastes into air, rivers, soil and sea.  Only the steady worsening of living conditions and
spread of environmental pollution-related illnesses from the 1970s, and the slow
maturation of civil society and transition to democracy, especially after 1987, served to
rein in the frenzy for development.  In the 1990s came the call to count the cost and
weigh options for the future.3)
The bureaucrats who presided over the development ‘miracle’ were heavily
influenced by Japanese models, not only that of Japan as it achieved industrialization
and its equally ‘miraculous’ growth in the 1960s but also by its earlier model of prewar
growth, especially as presented by the phenomenon of industrialization in the 1930s
‘puppet’ state of Manchukuo.  From 1972 they adopted the ‘Comprehensive National
Territorial Plan’ [Kukt’o chonghap kihoek] as the master-plan for harnessing the natural
environment, based on the Japanese Zenst. 4) The fourth such Plan was adopted in
January 2000, as the masterplan for the two decades to 2020.5) By the time the crisis of
1997 struck, Korean per capita GDP had risen to around 10,000 dollars and many
began to long for a relaxation in the frenzied pace of industrialization so that its fruits
might be enjoyed and its costs reassessed.  It was time, in that view, to end the
‘develop-at-all-costs-ism’ and seek a sustainable path, in harmony with nature rather
than at odds with it.6)
The developmental blueprint, however, remained in place, with plans for trebling
GDP over the coming two decades, which would mean also trebling energy demand,
industrial waste output and CO2 emissions, turning much of the country’s remaining
mud-flats on the West coast into farm, factory, or town site land, building 50 more
nuclear power stations (to add to the 12 already functioning) and nearly trebling the
number of large large, multi-purpose dams (from 12 to 32) over the same span.7)
Financial factors were undoubtedly paramount in the crash of 1997, but the underlying
crisis was of a more fundamental order.  The process of rethinking the meaning of
growth, and indeed the meaning of life, was stimulated in Korea as elsewhere by the
evidence of the fragility of the system as a whole.8) Yet the crisis, as Han notes, seems
to have had the effect of pushing the Korean leadership away from their tentative
ventures along the sustainability path and back to ‘productivity, competitiveness,
recovery, growth, and jobs’.9)
There are large political, economic, and social issues at stake here, but in this essay
we are concerned primarily with the footprint of development on the Korean natural
environment, especially with rivers (and their mountain watersheds) and coast.  Korea
is a narrow peninsula, two-thirds mountainous and forested, with many short, fast-
flowing rivers and a jagged, island-studded coastline.  The exploitation of nature,
including the rivers and coast, for food (irrigation), energy, transportation and town-
water was kept up during the great rush to development.  Large dams and reclamation
works played a central role, as elsewhere in the world, as symbols of modernity and
science.  By 1986, Korea, with an area equal to that of the single US state of Ohio, had
690 large dams, ranking No. 7 in global terms.10) There were few places to which the
hand of development had not reached, and they were either remote mountain areas or
the coastline, especially to the south-west.  Even in these areas, the process of transition
from the bio-diverse realm of nature to a complex of highly engineered and controlled
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human facilities, resting on concrete foundations, seemed to have an unstoppable
momentum. 
Three projects are here considered here: the Tong River dam, the Shihwa and
Saemangu˘m wetlands reclamation projects, and the various Imjin River (and DMZ)
development projects.
1. Tong River
Korea enjoys a rainfall that is relatively high by world standards (its annual
precipitation of 1,283 mms puts it at 30 per cent above the global average), but it is
concentrated in certain periods, especially the summer monsoon, and when calculated
in terms of ‘preserved amounts’ of water per head of population the figure falls to only
10 per cent of the global average.11) Two-thirds of it falls during the summer monsoon
season.  For UN purposes, Korea is a ‘water stress’ country, its degree of shortage
officially declared to be as chronic and serious as anywhere in the Asia-Pacific with the
exception of Singapore.12) The Korean government predicts that demand will outrun
supply by 2011, and recurrent droughts in the years spanning the transition between
the centuries suggested that even that might be optimistic.13) By 1990, 10 major multi-
purpose dams sat astride Korea’s main rivers (plus one estuary dyke on the Naktong
River), and the government was committed to building many more.14) Its 1995 plan
envisaged an additional 28 multi-purpose dams to be in service by the year 2011, 6 of
which were already under construction.15)
Seoul, from a small town with a population of less than three hundred thousand
people early in the twentieth century grew to a massive conurbation of 18 million by
the 1990s.16) At the mouth of the Han River, it faced problems of pollution, flooding ——
due to the violent summer storms that sent torrents of water crashing down from
upstream mountain areas —— and diminishing reserves of town water.  Following severe
floods in September 1990 (400 mms in 3 days) in which many lives were lost and
property damage was immense, a debate opened on a possible dam on the Tong
River, a turbulent, upstream tributary running through limestone karst, feeding into the
Han River several hundred kilometres east of the capital in Kangwo˘n province.  The
Tong is only 51 kilometres long and much of it so remote as to be inaccessible by road.
In 1997 the Ministry of Construction and Transport’s design for the Dam was adopted
by cabinet.  The projected dam, at its site, a place called Yo˘ngwo˘l about 200 kilometres
southwest of Seoul, would involve a 98 metres high retaining wall, 325 metres in width,
holding back a reservoir of 690 million tons of water, forcing the evacuation of some
526 households and submerging villages to 52 kilometres upstream from the site.  Its
primary purpose was to solve the flooding problem, but it would also generate 19,600
KW of electricity and contribute to the supply of town water to the Seoul city area.17)
Prior to the 1990s, once such a plan had been commissioned by the water
bureaucrats and adopted in cabinet, the dam would have been constructed without
further delay.  This plan, however, came just three years after the revolutionary
transformations of 1987, in which the military dictatorship was overthrown by
burgeoning civil society movements, and those movements quickly spread from the
narrow political focus on regime to environmental and quality of life matters.  The
decline in the air and water environment was palpable and environmental illnesses
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were commonly reported.   
Originally the project was opposed only by small groups of local residents, angered
at the prospect of loss of their homes and livelihood, plus a few environmentally
conscious activists, but the longer a start was delayed on the project, the more
opposition spread.  By the summer of 1999 the opposition encompassed a majority of
provincial governors (including the governor of Kangwo˘n-do), 10 mayors of
downstream villages and towns directly affected, and a majority of the people in the
region concerned.  Pro-dam were the mayors of Seoul and Inchon and the Governor of
Kyo˘nggi-do, the key officials of the downstream and Seoul city area, and the
bureaucrats of Ministry of Construction and Transport and the Korea Water Resources
Corporation.18) One influential study concluded that, even in purely economic terms,
the damage would outweigh the benefits.19) Another, based on close sociological and
anthropological research, found that the dam would bring zero benefit and
considerable negative consequence to residents of the area.20) Through 1998 and 1999,
many of the country’s most famous public figures joined in issuing statements of
opposition, or participating in various opposition demonstrations.21) International
environmental groups also became actively involved.22)
Statements from the president, Kim Dae Jung, who vacillated between sympathy
with the anti-dam cause and criticism of the media for giving voice to it, mirrored the
national uncertainty.  In 1997 and 1999 he publicly opposed the project, though
refraining from any step to actually cancel it, while in 1999 he also intimated that, for
flood prevention, there was no alternative.23) In August 2000, the Prime Minister tried
to cut the Gordian knot by appointing a task force to examine and advise.  The 33-
member committee was made up of an equal number of officials from the Ministry of
Construction and Transport on the one hand and of environmental activists and
academics nominated by the Korean Federation of Environmental Movements
(KFEM) on the other.  In the end, the committee recommended against construction.
It did so, however, only by reaching a consensus agreement on the need to preserve
natural and cultural values, construed in the broadest sense, treating Yo˘ngwo˘l as a
special case and thus avoiding an outcome there that might prejudice the national dam-
building program.24) In the end, what was decisive was not the safety or technical or
economic aspects but the magnitude of the social and environmental losses that
construction would entail.  Environmental studies have found the watershed of the
Tong River extraordinarily rich in fish and bird life, and in flora and fauna, with 30
species of plants, 30 of mammals (including the elusive otter, now extinct in
neighbouring Japan and thought to be a litmus test of the health of nature), 72 species
of birds (including not only many wild duck and heron but also the golden eagle,
several species of owl and of woodpecker), and 34 species of fish, including 17 that are
indigenous.25)
On Environment Day, June 5, 2000, Kim Dae Jung announced the cancellation and
ordered officials to undertake a search for alternative methods of addressing the need
for flood control and town water supply.  He also, following a Clinton administration
initiative, set up a Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development, comprising
cabinet ministers, civic leaders, and academics, to advise on environmentally friendly
and sustainable development.  It amounted to a victory for social scientists and
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anthropologists over engineers and bureaucrats, but was done in a way that allowed the
latter to avoid loss of face.26) Whether it would prove a watershed in the broad struggle
for sustainable over exploitative models of human-nature interaction remained to be
seen.
As the new century began, no new dam construction had been undertaken in Korea
since 1996, and the grandiose plans for massive developments carried over from the
1990s were on hold.27) The cancellation of the Tong River dam for environmental
reasons did mark a kind of watershed, being the first time development had been
sacrificed to environment.  It is somewhat of a miracle that the cuckoo, the otter and so
many other species should have survived, unharmed in the Tong River fastness,
despite the whirlwind of economic growth.  The degree of commitment to preservation
of their Tong River world that can be reached by Korean society in the early twenty
first century will be a litmus test of its commitment overall to sustainability over
growth. 
But the contest over values continued.  Can they not only survive, but thrive?  In the
twenty first century such an outcome would come to be seen as no less miraculous than
was economic growth in the twentieth.  Developmentalist officials of provincial and
county governments concentrated their efforts on finding a development substitute for
the dam, turning the Yo˘ngwo˘l area into a tourism center, expanding car parks and
other facilities which might in the end threaten the fragile environment just as much as
a dam.  Conservationists see this as ‘cashing in’ in the crudest sense on the assets.  They
favour declaring the district an ‘Ecological Protection Zone’, strictly supervised by the
Environment Ministry.  Contemplating gloomily this renewed confrontation over the
Tong River, Han remarked that ‘[i]t is not unlikely that Korea may fail to preserve the
environment even after canceling the dam.’28)
2. Wetlands
(a) Sihwa
In Korea (including the politically-opposed North as well as South Korea), as in
China, the practice of high-growth and environment-careless Japan tended to be
followed uncritically, as much admired as Japan’s prewar and wartime record of
militarism and imperialism was reviled.  That practice included the maximum creation
of ‘cheap’ land for agriculture, transportation (including airports), and urban
development, and was followed religiously.  Korea’s West coast maze of tidal flats,
complex inlets and many small islands, washed by a tide that in the north, around
Inchon, reached 10 metres in depth, and comparable in area to the Wadden Sea in
Western Europe, seemed a prime case of nature lying dormant and under-utilized,
waiting to be developed.29) Geologically, it was the product of relatively recent (most
likely around 10,000 years) time, fed by the sediment load of China’s Yellow River as
well as Korea’s own rivers.  The possibility of drawing straight, engineered lines across
from land point to land point, incorporating small islets and even islands, building
levees and then draining to create new land, had been noted and practiced by colonial
Japan in the 1920s and 1930s, primarily for the creation of rice-growing agricultural
land at a time when the policy imperative was maintenance of the supply of cheap rice
for Japan.  An estimated 40 thousand hectares was reclaimed then under the Japanese
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regime, and a further somewhat greater area, including the site of some of the country’s
major industrial complexes on the south and east coast, in the 1960s and 1970s.30)
Under a National Reclamation Master Plan drawn up in the 1980s, the goal of
eventually reclaiming 85 per cent of remaining tidal flats was set out by the year 2018
was set out.31) Quite apart from the economic incentives, the idea that Korea’s narrow
mountainous territory could be significantly expanded in this way appealed to the
nationalist spirit of the time.  In the 1990s, Korea led the world in reclamation.32) By the
1990s, the area of surviving tidal wetlands was estimated at about 285,000 hectares
(with a slightly larger area in adjacent North Korea).33) The wetland area in South
Korea alone was thus nearly 6 times greater than what remained in Japan, estimated at
about 51,000 hectares.34) By the end of the century works were underway to reclaim an
additional 76,000 hectares. 
As the twentieth century came to an end, the contest between human engineering
and scientific rationalism and insatiable developmentalist hunger on the one hand and
nature’s complex, apparently irrational and extravagant, crooked and twisted patterns
on the other was fought nowhere more determinedly than on Korea’s West coast.
Shihwa and Saemangu˘m constitute two crucial sites.
In 1986 the plan was adopted to seal off and reclaim the 17,000 hectare area of
Kyo˘nggi Bay, only about 35 kilometres south-west of Seoul, known as Shihwa, a single
site which dwarfed Japan’s Isahaya by more than five times.  So vast is this expanse
that it incorporated more than 100 kilometres of winding coastline.  The reclaimed sea
was to be used to create about 5,000 hectares of agricultural land, 1,300 of industrial
sites, 4,000 of town and residential, and a freshwater lake of 6,100 hectares.  The dyke
was completed and drainage began in 1994.  At the time, there was virtually no
opposition, and the residents of the area were inspired by the promise of growth,
modernity and prosperity.35) Work commenced the following year on construction of a
12.6 kilometre-long dyke between Shihu˘ng City and Taebu Island. 
The outcome shocked the country.  With the outlet to the sea blocked, industrial,
agricultural, and household wastes flowed into the lake and were simply trapped and
accumulated there.  Once fertile seas were turned into a stinking and polluted mess of
cadmium, chrome, copper, lead and agricultural chemicals; ethyl mercury was detected
on the lakebed.  Countless organisms died.  The disaster spread as KOWACO (the
Korean Water Resources Corporation) began secretly and illegally discharging severely
polluted water into the surrounding sea, causing considerable damage to fisheries.36)
The water quality was so poor as to be useless even for irrigation.  COD level pre
enclosure of 4 mgs per litre rose by 1997 to more than 20 mgs,37) and levels of nitrogen
and phosphorous also rose precipitously.  The newly created ‘lands’ sprouted a scrubby
undergrowth, but salt levels remained too high for them to be of agricultural use.
Locally, residents were aghast.  Nationally, a television documentary in 1996 drew
attention to the unfolding disaster.  In 1997, Korea signed the Ramsar Convention on
protection of wetlands and in December 1998 passed a special law to give effect to it.
In the southeast of the country the U˘ip’o Wetlands, largest in the country, was given a
Ramsar designation (March 1998), and in July 1998 a huge (55,000 hectare)
reclamation design on the Yo˘ngsan River in the southwest (flowing into the sea at the
city of Mokpo) was canceled.38) A tidal shift in values and assumptions about growth
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was underway.
In the context of this dramatic switch in national mood, the government in
November 1998 announced that the project would be radically revised.  The sluice
gates were opened and the ‘freshwater’ lake idea abandoned.  Thereafter, the quality of
water steadily improved, COD levels dropped (to 4.3mgs per litre in 2000),39) fish and
shellfish returned to the lake’s waters and so, gradually, did the birds that feed on
them.40) A government survey in 1999 found significant populations of rare and
endangered species, including Saunder’s gull, black-winged stilt, ruddy shelduck,
whooper swan, swan goose, and black-crowned night heron.41) As the reclaimed land
slowly stabilized, even though not used for its planned agricultural purpose, nature
slowly adapted to the changes and boar, rabbit, raccoon, deer and other forms of life
settled in the scrub.42)
Only belatedly were Koreans coming to perceive mudflats not just as a potential
extension to the national territory or a source of relatively easy economic benefit but a
cradle and nursery crucial to fisheries, a water-purifying filter of almost inestimable
value, and a source of biodiversity whose ultimate economic worth could never be
known.  Aesthetic and recreational value also came to be freshly appreciated.  As Nial
Moores, Kyungnam University researcher and ecological planner with Korean
Wetlands Alliance, wrote (of a section of bay slightly north of Sihwa):43)
‘In Kyeongii Bay, at Panweol tidal-flat, for example, researchers found as many as
47,000 benthos per meter square ... crowded into an area not much bigger than a
television set.  Such high densities mean that tidal-flats are amongst the most
productive eco-systems on earth——as valuable and full of life as even the Amazon
Rain Forest.  Beyond this the shallows act as fish nurseries, while the biomass
thrives on nutrients that would otherwise reach levels threatening to human
health.’44)
(b) Saemangu˘m
Although the conspicuous failure of Kowaco’s design at Shihwa seemed to have
occasioned a fundamental rethink of the value of tidal flats, one huge project, dwarfing
even Shihwa in scale, still continued into the early twenty first century.  There, it
seemed that the coalition of national and provincial developmentalist bureaucrats and
local vested interests had dug in its heels and might still have the political weight to
push to completion the world’s greatest reclamation. 
The Saemangu˘m tidal-flats fan out for 25 kilometres from the mouth of the
Mangyo˘ng and Tongjin rivers off Pyo˘nsan in North Cho˘lla province (about 220 kms
southwest of Seoul).  This vast, teeming and prolific realm of abundance and beauty is
one of Korea’s most bio-diverse wetlands.  An astonishing 158 species of fish have been
recorded there, and the bird-life, including many species that stop over here on the
long migration between Siberia and Australia-New Zealand, is probably more prolific
than anywhere in the country.45) The loss of many precious sites in Japan redoubles the
importance of remaining sites such as this, and the obligation under the Ramsar Treaty
to protect sites would seem squarely and unambiguously to apply to Saemangu˘m.
The idea of reclaiming the region was first proposed in 1975, then planned in detail
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in 1986 and launched in 1991, with an initial completion date of 2004.  It involved
building a 33 kms long seawall to reclaim a vast 40,000 hectare section of bay, thereby
expanding the national territory by an area the size of the country’s second city of
Pusan.  In place of the tidal-flats would be 28,300 hectares of farmland plus 11,800
hectares fresh-water reservoir for irrigation.46)
Like Shihwa, Saemangu˘m was surrounded by controversy.  A nation-wide coalition
developed around it, a documentary film about it attracted attention, and a special
investigative task-force was formed to investigate and advise on it.  Dutch engineers
and Korean experts warned that the lakes would be severely polluted, like Shihwa, and
the water unusable.47)
However, Saemangu˘m is much further than Shihwa from Seoul, and is located in
one of the poorest prefectures, where the hunger for growth is strong and ‘green’
politics thinly based.  Through the long decades of growth developmentalism under
military dictatorship and the transition regimes that ruled from 1961 to 1987, the
political and bureaucratic elite was formed from the provinces of the south-east, while
Cholla in the southwest was regarded as a troublesome and dissident zone,
discriminated against and starved of development funds.48) The major indices,
especially of population and share of national GDP, show North Cho˘lla’s steady
economic decline over the three decades from the 1960’s.49)
1960s 1970s 1985 2001
Population 9.6 7.7 4.0
Regional % of GDP 6.6 5.0 3.5 (2001)
To the visitor, the sense of traveling back in time as one heads southwest from Seoul
to Cho˘lla  is strong, and it is not difficult to understand the sense of ‘backwardness’ and
the desire of people to grasp at straws offered by national and provincial governments
to redress it.  In Cho˘lla, as for example in Japan’s Okinawa, a growth and development
coalition dominates local politics while the rest of the country slowly moves beyond it.
In both areas long neglect, absence of secondary industry, high rates of unemployment
and dependence on government-funded public works, and the assumption that the
government is almighty, prevail.  A dependent ethos, born of a history of
discrimination and backwardness, tends to unite common people and local government
and political, business, and media elites, around a strategy of soliciting national
investment in infrastructure and public works and promoting to local leadership those
thought best able to influence the center to achieve it.50) Unlike Japan’s Isahaya,
fishermen do not spearhead the opposition in Korea, even though the losses have been
roughly comparable.51)
It was the sentiment of local pride that seems to have motivated many of the half
million people in Cholla (roughly one in four of the population) who in October 2001
signed the demand that the reclamation works go ahead.  Thus mobilized, pride
functions paradoxically to entrench external dependence, especially on the national
government.  As Okinawans under reformist and conservative governors alike,
continued to believe that Tokyo would bless them with huge projects ——a
Cosmopolitan City, an IT center, a research university —— to bring them up in line with
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the rest of the country, so Cho˘lla people tended to believe that reclamation would
bring them a vast industrial complex, the status of ‘hub for Northeast Asia’,52) complete
with harbour and airport, even though the official design included no such things.53) It
seemed, to a journalist from The Korea Herald, that the people had ‘gambled their
collective destiny entirely on the reclamation project.’ 54) It is to Korea what the Three
Gorges Dam was to China, with the qualification that while the crucial factor in China
is national prestige, in Korea it is provincial prestige.
In 1998, the authorities yielded to widespread pressure by first halting the works
temporarily, then in 1999 setting up a 22-member advisory commission, composed of
experts, journalists, NGO representatives and academics, but unlike Shihwa this
committee ended its two years of deliberations indecisively.  The newly set-up
Presidential Commission on Sustainable Development urged the president to delay the
decision pending further study, but on May 25, 2001 the works were resumed, the
government intent on completion, the date for which was now pushed back to 2011.  It
had cost one trillion won, and would yet cost an additional two trillion.55) NGO
estimates of the cost are much greater.  Assuming overruns characteristic of such
infrastructural projects, they project a final figure of 16 trillion won.56) As trees and
flowers are planted along the newly expanded roads, and the resumed works are
officially represented as ‘ecologically friendly’, Kyung-Koo Han described it as
tantamount to ‘humanistic torture’ or ‘beautiful murder’.57)
During 2001, the two camps consolidated around the resumed works.  A ‘Peace
Alliance of Tidal Flat-lands for the Saemangeum Reclamation Works Suspension’
brought together 60 civic, religious and environmental organizations united around the
goal of conserving the exceptional biodiversity of the tidal wetland and rejecting the
promise of land and water as false and misleading, false in the case of the water
because it was almost certain to be just as polluted as at Shihwa, and misleading in the
case of the land because the agricultural land was not needed and its expensive
creation contradicted Seoul’s policies of an open agricultural market.  They also
pointed out that the reclamation works wrought complex damage not only on the
marine environment but on the mountains too, because the 33 kilometre-long dyke
requires a vast quantity of construction materials, amounting to 130,000 15 ton
truckloads of rock and soil from three nearby mountains.58) For them, no economic
gain could compensate for the harm that would be done to nature if the works were
completed. 
3. The DMZ and the ‘Imjin Dam’ Project
Along with the pockets of mountain or coastal land upstream on the Tong and
downstream around the mouth of the Mangyo˘ng and Tongjin rivers, the single great
undeveloped zone in Korea is the one best known, however misleadingly, as
‘Demilitarized’.  The ‘Demilitarized Zone’ (hereafter DMZ) stretches for 248 kilometres
across the peninsula and comprises a belt on either side of the demilitarized line which
since July 1953 has served as the ceasefire line dividing northern and southern control.
For nearly half a century this strip has been literally a ‘no-man’s land’, free of
developmental impact.
As the freeze in North-South relations gradually thaws, especially following the June
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2000 visit to the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, of South Korean president Kim
DaeJung, the future of the DMZ becomes an issue.  Nominally a strip of 4 kilometres,
two on each side, in some places the zone actually stretches for 20 kilometres.59)
Although not subjected to ‘normal’ development pressures, it is far from being a true
wilderness.  The Korean War was fought savagely across it, turning much of it into a
charred wasteland from which recovery is still incomplete.  Since it ended in 1953,
much of it has been heavily mined and parts of it deliberately burned or defoliated to
improve military vantage.  Nevertheless, many rare and protected species do survive. 
To the west, the zone abuts the rich tidelands already discussed above, where
development has encroached steadily.  Incheon International Airport, that opened in
March 2001 on a 5,700 hectare reclaimed tidal-flat site offshore at Inchon, 50
kilometres west of Seoul, is a conspicuous example.  The huge airport, with two 4,000
metre runways, and two more to be constructed in the coming decade, operates on a
round-the-clock basis and with no noise restrictions.  It was expecting an initial load of
27 million passengers per year (the equal of Japan’s Narita Airport in 2000), followed
by a steady increase in due course to 100 million, double that of Chicago’s O’Hare (the
world's biggest).  Whether this can be accommodated without major disruption of the
delicate and fertile marine environment of this huge coastal region seemed doubtful.
Supersonic and natural rhythms do not easily co-exist.  The complex planned to
surround the airport includes a theme park, casino, golf links, convention center,
marina, international financial center and shopping mall.60) Close-by, in the DMZ zone
just south of the North Korean city of Kaeso˘ng, following the North-South demarche of
2000, Hyundai Corporation has been involved in construction of roads and
infrastructure for a giant new industrial complex.  Although all sections of the Inchon
tidal-flats surveyed by the Korean Wetlands Alliance meet the criteria for identification
as ‘internationally important’, and therefore trigger the obligation on the Korean
government to protect them, many birds, including critically endangered species such
as Nordmann’s Greenshank and whimbrel, have registered a significant decline in
numbers since the reclamation.61) Few of the passengers passing through the terminals
of the new Incheon International Airport are likely to spare a thought for the avian
long-distance travelers for whom Inchon also counts as a stopover.
To the north, North Korea has long been pursuing strategies identical with South
Korea for expanding its national territory, sacrificing fisheries and marine environment
for new industrial, urban and especially agricultural land.62) Natural disasters through
the 1990s dealt heavy blows at North Korea's attempts to construct its ‘socialist’ system,
but the symmetry of developmentalist commitment on both sides of the border during
the three decades from the 1960s through the 1990s is as notable as is the political and
military opposition. 
Developmentalist bureaucrats and businesses eye the resources and potential of
North Korea with keen interest.  Immeasurably more undeveloped than Cholla, the
water bureaucrats of Kowaco estimate that they could build 40 large dams over 15
meters high in the basins of North Korean rivers.63) They are especially interested in
the idea of building a large dam on the Imjin River, which flows from headwaters in
North Korea across the DMZ just to the east of Panmunjom before joining the Han
River and flowing into the Yellow Sea.  The projected dam, whose reservoir would
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flood a large tract of land just north of the DMZ, would contain a 1.5 billion tons of
water and be capable, they say, of preventing the chronic floods that from time to time
devastate the northwest of Kyo˘nggi province.64) It would also, however, flood much of
the rich ecosystem of sandbanks, mud and sandflats, habitat for a number or rare and
endangered species of birds, refuge for thousands of water fowl, wild geese, cranes and
eagles, including occasionally the rare Stellar's Sea eagle.65)
4. Construction State vs. Conservation State
The projects considered here ——Tong River dam, Shihwa and Saemangu˘m
reclamation, and Imjin River and Inchon tidal flats development projects——were
designed to answer problems of water and land: urban and industrial water shortage
and flooding, that is, both deficiency and surplus of water, and deficiency of land, by
creating new stocks of fresh water and more land.  Is Korea really so deficient in land
and water as to need these works, and is there no alternative to cope with flooding
other than the large dam?
The Korean government insists that Korea is water poor.  During the 1990s, per
capita supply rose slightly, from 376 to 382 litres.66) The Korean Water Resources
Corporation insists that it will be necessary to increase that to 411 litres by the year
2011; the construction of new dams is seen as the only way forward.67)
The logic is puzzling.  It may be that the average North American consumes around
773 litres (170 gallons) per day, but that is more than seven times the per capita
average in the rest of the world and nearly triple Europe’s level.  The WHO
recommends a minimum of 100 litres per day, and commonly a figure of between 200
and 300 litres is regarded as more than adequate.68) The figure for Germany is 132
litres, for Denmark 246 and for France 281 litres; by Korean government statistics,
somewhat astonishingly, Korea tops the OECD in water consumption.69) The real
Korean domestic consumption figure, according to the Ministry of the Environment,
after due allowance is made for wastage (which in the case of Seoul accounts for around
40 per cent of supply),70) is actually around 290 litres.71) The scope for conservation and
recycling of water should also be considerable.  Industrial and agricultural usage, 74
per cent of overall water demand, leveled off from 1994, and there is no reason to think
that household demand has not also leveled off and that demand cannot be held to
current levels or reduced, while efficiency is drastically increased.  There are strong
policy reasons for adopting such a path. 
The second water consideration is the very serious doubt over whether the
bureaucratic prescription would actually serve to meet any such need.  Shihwa’s water
proved unusable, even for agriculture, and there is no reason to think that
Saemangu˘m’s would be any different, while even the Tong River water seems to be not
suitable for drinking (according to the Institute of Forestry Research).72)
As for the Tong River and Imjin River dams as flood control devices, again there is
reason to be skeptical.  First, floods originating in North Korea owe much to
deforestation, which in turn is the consequence of poverty and mismanagement, i.e. it
has political causes and most likely can only be solved by political changes leading to
more sustainable land management practices, especially perhaps the eventual
unification of the peninsula.  A large dam upstream from Seoul, especially one such as
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that envisioned for the Imjin, might as much threaten as reassure the capital.  The only
dam that could be of use for flood control would be one left empty, and therefore of
zero use for water supply; the two ends are contradictory.  A huge dam, poised above
the capital and full of water, would represent a potential catastrophe for Seoul.  Close
cooperation by Seoul with Pyongyang in re-forestation and agricultural reform might
do much more to solve this problem than dam construction.  The experience of river
management internationally, where the construction of large dams  is now commonly
thought to have increased the danger and scale of flooding,73) may have much of
relevance for Koreans faced with the severe flooding of recent years.74)
So far as the requirement to extend the national territory, whether for the nominal
goal of creation of farmland or the hidden goal of creating industrial and transportation
sites, this too seems doubtful.  Much farmland is under-utilized regionally and
nationally, and the countryside is being slowly de-populated due to industrialization.
Each year 30,000 hectares of farmland is lost due to changes in land-use.75) Surely it
would make more sense to save a single year’s loss, retaining 30,00 hectares, rather
than to take such elaborate measures as are being taken over decades of intense
engineering at Saemangu˘m to create it?  With the Korean government embracing the
World Trade Order as gospel,76) it is difficult to imagine how the huge costs of
reclamation could be absorbed and a globally competitive agriculture emerge at
Saemangeum, at least in the near future, from the sodden, salty fields that can be
expected there. 
It also appears that the bureaucratic calculations take no consideration of the recent
international rethinking about the economic value of ecosystems.  Wetlands, especially
tidal and estuarine wetlands, in their natural state, are now calculated to be of huge
economic value——for water regulation, nutrient recycling, waste treatment, disturbance
regulation, erosion control, food and raw material production, and recreation and
leisure.  Coastal estuarine waters such as Saemangu˘m and the Imjin River tidal-flats are
thought to be worth a minimum of 22,832 US dollars per year, a figure likely to rise as,
or if, ‘natural capital and ecosystem services become more stressed and more “scarce”
in future’.77) A more recent estimate puts the value of tidal flats as 100 times that of the
equivalent area of farmland.78) Such calculations seem to have played no part in the
planning of either Shihwa, Saemangu˘m or the Imjin flats.  Korean tradition, which
values agricultural production above all, seems still to be entrenched in bureaucratic
and much of popular thinking.
As for the possible creation of land for industrial sites, cities, airports, harbours, etc,
which seems so to inspire the officials and people of North Cho˘lla, it is hard to imagine
what particular benefits will accrue to land specially created by reclamation that would
prove competitive against the burgeoning industrial sites along the China coast (or, for
that matter, North Korea, in the increasingly likely event of Korean unification within a
generation or so).  The notion of industrialization that inspires Cho˘lla is rooted in a
twentieth century model of economic growth that seems already archaic as part of a
blueprint for the twenty first.
In these contests over water may be seen the deep-rooted global contest over value
and meaning that characterizes the transition from growth to sustainable civilization.
Korean planners tend still to look at the growth trajectories of the past and assume they
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must be replicated in future. Their assumption that the graph line for water supply and
water consumption, like industrial production and GDP, must continue to rise —— by
21.9 per cent between 1998 and 201179) —— is a statement of faith and continuing belief
in the dogmas of the growth-obsessed twentieth century, contradicting the govern-
ment’s pledge of commitment to sustainability. The difficulty of adjusting to the
civilizational shift from the modern to the sustainable for Korea is accentuated by five
decades of division and militarization, and three decades of explosive GDP-expanding
growth. The dynamism and vision of Korea’s civil society, however, amply demonstrated
in the struggles analysed in this paper, gives reason to hope that the transition may yet
be made.
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